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ABSTRACT
A recent article comments on some of the shortcomings of the National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the United
Kingdom. This counterpoint article discusses the key issues in more
detail and suggests ways in which NICE might improve, given the
difﬁculties in making resource allocation decisions under a budget
contraint.
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Introduction
The preceding article by Carroll [1] contains several suggestions
for improving the methods and processes employed by the
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in
the United Kingdom. In general, we ﬁnd the suggestions to be
well argued and thoroughly researched. Nevertheless, as Carroll
himself states, in the world of health-care resource allocation,
“there are no easy solutions.” Therefore, in this counterpoint, we
explore some of the points in further detail and identify some of
the associated problems.
The Role of NICE
Carroll points out that “the Institute has attracted criticism and
been a source of ongoing media controversy,” and suggests that
there is a “communication deﬁcit” that needs to be remedied.
While this is true, it is more difﬁcult to apportion blame and to
suggest ways forward. To a large extent, denying access to health
care by explicit means is bound to lead to discontent, because the
general public interpret this as beneﬁts being denied. The oppor-
tunity cost argument, which implies that beneﬁts are only being
denied because even greater beneﬁts can be delivered elsewhere,
is much more difﬁcult to convey. Moreover, the technical nature
of NICE’s work poses a potential barrier to broader public
understanding of its remit and the processes underlying its guid-
ance. This may facilitate the conception that the institute’s deci-
sions stem more from considerations of affordability, as opposed
to costs and patient beneﬁts.
The blame for the general lack of understanding about
NICE’s work probably needs to be shared between NICE itself,
academia, and the media. Although NICE pays considerable
attention to communication issues, it could focus the debate
more on delivering beneﬁts than controlling costs, by continually
emphasizing the opportunity cost principle. Of course, the
branding of economics as “the dismal science” [2] is not surpris-
ing, given the focus of researchers on communicating cost-
effectiveness as opposed to beneﬁt maximization. Finally, from
the media’s standpoint, it is much more newsworthy to claim
that, as a result of NICE’s deliberations, patients have been
denied an important treatment, rather than to report that,
accounting for all relevant considerations, NICE has reached a
fairly well-balanced decision.
Nevertheless, as Carroll argues, there is scope for much more
engagement of the general public in these difﬁcult choices, and to
convince the community that NICE is working for its interests,
rather than against them. Indeed, references in the media to
NICE as the “NHS drugs watchdog” or the “NHS’s rationing
body” have not helped in this regard and have created the
impression that NICE has a cost-containment agenda. To this
end, the suggestions made by Carroll, which include extending
the role of NICE’s Citizens Council, introducing a “NICE
Charter,” and establishing an “NHS Board,” have some merit.
The extension of the role of the Citizens Council will certainly
require additional resources, and it will be important to ensure
that any extended participation of the general public is more than
merely symbolic.
The policy paper issued by the Conservative Party, upon
which Carroll’s suggestions are based, recommends an expansion
of NICE’s role to include the provision of evidence-based com-
missioning guidelines for use across the NHS. While evidence-
based commissioning would certainly be a positive step forward,
caution must be exercised against extending the remit of an
already stretched NICE in a direction that may put the indepen-
dence of the institute into further question. This point also
applies to Conservatives’ ideas around involvement of NICE in
drug pricing.
Improving Dialogue with Pharma
Carroll states that “it is widely recognised that there are continu-
ing difﬁculties in the relationship between NICE and the phar-
maceutical industry, particularly when medicines are deemed not
cost-effective for use in the NHS.” We wonder whether much of
this antagonism is merely blaming the messenger for the message.
Reviews of international health technology assessment entities
show that NICE fares very well in comparison with others on the
criterion of stakeholder involvement, including the involvement
of the pharmaceutical industry [3].
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This does not mean that stakeholder involvement could not
be improved, and the suggestions made by Carroll, and by the
Health Select Committee [4] merit detailed consideration. Some
have already been acted upon, such as the willingness by NICE to
have “early engagement” with manufacturers about how their
plans for clinical and economic assessments of products might
generate reliable and valuable information on cost-effectiveness
[5].
If Carroll’s suggestion of a “steering committee comprising
representatives from industry and NICE” was pursued, we hope
that it would encourage a two-way learning process. Namely,
while NICE surely has something to learn about the needs of the
pharmaceutical industry, the industry still has a considerable
amount to learn about the needs of payers operating under a
budget constraint. Even today, after almost 30 years of activity in
pharmacoeconomics, clinical development plans still include
compounds which would struggle to be cost-effective, given com-
panies’ current pricing expectations. It is increasingly important
for new clinical entities to be judged from a value perspective as
well as their scientiﬁc interest.
The Appraisal Process
Carroll makes several important points about the long period of
time NICE has often taken to reach a decision. Many similar
points were made by the Health Select Committee [4]. Recent
development in NICE’s activities suggests that many of these
points are being taken on board, such as starting appraisals
earlier, as soon as it becomes clear that a given drug is likely to
obtain a license. There are two main concerns about speeding up
NICE’s decision-making processes. First, it may be difﬁcult to
maintain the same level of stakeholder consultation. Indeed,
Haycox [6] points out that many of the delays in NICE technol-
ogy appraisals occur after the ﬁrst appraisal committee meeting,
as a result of stakeholder comments and appeals.
Second, under single technology appraisals (STAs), where the
burden of proof lies with the manufacturer, the thoroughness of
the assessment may not be as great as under multiple technology
appraisals (MTAs), where the independent evaluation group
undertakes its own assessment. One of the most original sugges-
tions made by Carroll is to rethink the relative roles of STAs and
MTAs, the former being used as an evaluative screen and the
latter being reserved for more complete appraisal, for those tech-
nologies where product value is most uncertain. Presumably,
MTAs would also be best suited in circumstances where there is
sufﬁcient available evidence for appraisal.
Given the all-important need to be more timely in its decision-
making, NICE is now moving toward the position suggested by
Carroll, with very fewMTAs being undertaken. Indeed, it may be
that the majority of future MTAs are undertaken within NICE’s
clinical guidelines program, such as the recent reappraisal of
drugs for schizophrenia, undertaken within the revised schizo-
phrenia guideline [7]. Nevertheless, if this does become the case,
the status of NICE’s clinical guidelines, which currently are not
mandatory on the NHS, may need to be reviewed. Apart from
the more detailed assessment that takes place within MTAs, there
are beneﬁts to be drawn from the mere fact that several alterna-
tive therapies are being compared with one another using a
common methodology. It would be unfortunate if this were to
disappear altogether.
Furthermore, while STAs have reduced the time taken for
assessments, there is still room for improvement to reach the
target time frame of 9.75 months [8]. As STAs rely heavily, if not
solely, on manufacturer data, actions around improving dialogue
with industry will gain further importance. Use of risk-sharing
arrangements, as highlighted below, or Coverage with Evidence
Development schemes, may help address any uncertainties asso-
ciated using STAs as an “evaluative screen.”
Other suggestions by Carroll focus on the assessment topic
selection process, with ideas of eliminating ministerial referral
and, where appropriate, supporting the appraisal of all new
active substances. The plans to give NICE direct responsibility
for topic referral and selection should indeed facilitate greater
transparency, or at least perceptions thereof, as the previous
process was somewhat unclear, yielding suspicions about the
inﬂuence of political priorities or interests. As for Carroll’s latter
point, we maintain that NICE should have the resources to
support the appraisal of a broader range of new technologies,
such as medical devices and diagnostics, and not just new active
substances. This also entails a greater focus on areas of disinvest-
ment to ensure that the most cost-effective, high-value inventions
are used in the NHS.
Affordability and Cost-Effectiveness
Carroll points out that there has been an ongoing debate about
NICE’s use of a cost per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY)
threshold. This debate consists of: 1) whether there should be a
threshold at all; 2) whether it is set at the “right” level; and 3)
whether the threshold should be the same for all therapies in all
disease areas [9]. NICE itself recently held a consultation on
whether a different threshold should apply in the case of “end-
of-life” treatment [10], and in an earlier working paper, the
institute suggested that a different threshold might be applied in
the case of ultra-orphan drugs [11].
Several analysts have suggested that the estimate of incremen-
tal cost per QALY may not capture all the relevant components
of social value [12], and research has been commissioned on the
social value of a QALY [13,14]. Although there is a growing
consensus within the UK that NICE’s use of a cost per QALY
threshold needs to be accompanied by a deliberative decision-
making process, there is less agreement about whether adjust-
ments should be more explicitly applied at a second stage, after
the consideration of cost-effectiveness. Carroll is probably right
by suggesting the need to consider a broader range of social costs
and beneﬁts, although the most important aspect would be to
encourage a broader societal debate about these difﬁcult choices,
as suggested earlier.
That is, if different criteria are to be applied to “end-of-life”
therapies, the community needs to debate what would be forgone
elsewhere in the health-care system to pay for this, or whether a
few months of additional life is worth signiﬁcant additional
public investment. For example, is it the case that the standard
costs per QALY calculations give a higher priority to treatments
for minor, self-limiting conditions than the broader public, if
asked, would wish to apply? If so, the impression is that the
funding for these investments should be reduced, perhaps by
increasing copayments. Public deliberation of these issues is espe-
cially important given the lack of evidence supporting an “appro-
priate” threshold and the often negative connotations associated
with its use (i.e., its representation as a de facto “affordability
threshold”).
Implementation of Guidance
Carroll rightly points out that a major objective of NICE was to
end the “postcode lottery,” where there was geographical varia-
tion in the availability of expensive new treatments in the NHS in
England and Wales. His solution is to ensure that NICE guidance
is more fully implemented than at present. While we do not
disagree, it has to be remembered that, to a certain extent, ending
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the postcode lottery may be an illusion. Namely, to ensure a
standardized availability of treatments in the NHS, we would
need to mandate not only which new treatments were intro-
duced, but also which existing ones should be reduced or aban-
doned [15]. That is, if NICE were to mandate that a new drug
should be used in the treatment of breast cancer, one NHS Trust
may decide to pay for this by insisting on savings in other cancer
therapy, whereas another may cut home respite care for the
elderly.
Therefore, to ensure a true end to postcode rationing, NICE
needs to be saying more about the treatments and technologies
that should be discontinued by the NHS, in addition to those that
should be introduced (as intimated earlier). This would include
additional direction to local authorities on the practical and
ﬁnancial considerations of NICE guidance implementation, such
as improved ﬁnancial planning and horizon scanning. In relation
to this, the Department (i.e., Ministry) of Health would need to
be more prescriptive than at present about how budgets for the
different aspects of health-care provision are set at the local level.
As in some insurance-based health-care systems, there may be a
need to deﬁne the basic “package” of services, hopefully through
a process that incorporates cost-effectiveness considerations.
NHS Drug Availability
Here, Carroll points to the challenge of ensuring good value for
money for the health-care system, while providing appropriate
incentives for pharmaceutical R&D. We agree that value-based
pricing and risk-sharing schemes have an important role to play
in situations where the long-term beneﬁt of therapies is uncer-
tain, or where their ﬁnal, optimum positioning in the sequence of
care has yet to be determined. Nevertheless, the devil is in the
detail and it will only be possible to determine the usefulness of
these policies once there is more experience with applying them.
Conclusion: No Easy Solutions
Carroll’s editorial identiﬁes many of the major issues in seeking
to maximize the beneﬁts from the use of scarce health-care
resources. Indeed, there are no easy solutions. The solutions he
offers come from the aforementioned paper issued by the Con-
servative Party, the main political opposition in the UK at the
present time. We have responded to these suggestions in a tech-
nical, rather than political, fashion. Nevertheless, Carroll’s com-
ments do raise one important political point. Namely, the
existence of a body like NICE, and the need to allocate health-
care resources in an evidence-based fashion, subject to budget
constraints, are not being questioned by either major political
party in the UK. Unlike some jurisdictions, there is no suggestion
that cost should be excluded from the evaluation of treatment
options, or a pretence that all effective therapy should be pro-
vided to citizens irrespective of costs. Despite the imperfections
with NICE, in terms of facing up to the realities, the UK may be
a step ahead.
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